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	<title>Security Balance &#187; ROSI</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.securitybalance.com/category/rosi/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.securitybalance.com</link>
	<description>trying to bring balance to the Force</description>
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		<title>The security decision making WAVE!</title>
		<link>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/11/the-security-decision-making-wave/</link>
		<comments>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/11/the-security-decision-making-wave/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2009 03:18:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>apbarros</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ROSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trends]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decision making]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[google wave]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/11/the-security-decision-making-wave/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I&#8217;m starting a Wave on Google Wave to build a collaboration piece on security decision making. Please send me your contact if you want to participate. It starts like this:&#160; Security decision making Dear security friends, I&#8217;m planning for a long time to work on a paper/presentation about security decision making. I was planning to [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><span class="status-body"></p>
<p>            <span class="actions"></span><span class="entry-content">I&#8217;m starting a Wave<br />
on <a href="https://wave.google.com/">Google Wave</a> to build a collaboration piece on security decision making. Please send<br />
me your contact if you want to participate.</p>
<p>It starts like this:</span></span><a id="status_star_5878207358" class="fav-action non-fav" title="favorite this tweet"><br />&nbsp; </a><span class="status-body"><span class="actions">
<div></div>
<p></span><span class="entry-content"></span></span>
<p style="font-weight: bold">Security decision making</p>
<p>Dear security friends,</p>
<p>I&#8217;m<br />
planning for a long time to work on a paper/presentation about security<br />
decision making. I was planning to talk with different security<br />
professionals to hear about how their decision making process works and<br />
where it can be improved. But I&#8217;ve just realized that Google Wave is<br />
the perfect tool for a collaboration job like that. I will, of course,<br />
provide the proper credits to anyone who contributes. <img src='http://www.securitybalance.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':-)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
<p>Well, some classification and and taxonomy first. I think we could try to break decision making in:</p>
<p>-<br />
Scope: it can be from a single application to a whole organization. I&#8217;m<br />
quite sure that the process changes from one to another, so it makes<br />
sense to consider it.</p>
<p>- Type of decision: what is the goal of the decision? The most common are:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Trade-offs: the famous control x productivity impact</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Cost: should I take the risk or pay to reduce/eliminate it</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Control Prioritization: among all those security controls, which one should I implement first?</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Risk prioritization: among all those risks, which one should I tackle first?</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">-<br />
Security optimization: considering all the resources available, how to<br />
deploy them in a way to maximize security (minimize risk)</p>
<p>- Method:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">-<br />
Risk measurement: going through the vanilla process of measuring<br />
exposure, impact, threat level, likelihood and getting the resulting<br />
risk.</p>
<p style="margin-left: 42px">- Qualitative</p>
<p style="margin-left: 42px">- Quantitative: ROSI</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Benchmarking: comparing what others are doing under similar situations</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">- Regulatory/compliance: doing because it is required</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">-<br />
Metric based: this triggers the whole discussion about security<br />
metrics, what should be measured, how and what are the desirable values.</p>
<p>- Trends:</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">-<br />
There are several issues with the risk assessment methodologies. I<br />
don&#8217;t like the feeling of &#8220;educated guess&#8221; from the qualitative<br />
assessments and there are a lot of conceptual failures on theROSI side.<br />
Also, the data available is not good enough to generate good impact and<br />
likelihood numbers. Some researchers believe we should generate new<br />
models to avoid these pitfalls</p>
<p style="margin-left: 14px">-<br />
Prescriptive standards: apply more prescriptive regulations, such as<br />
PCI DSS, to reduce the &#8220;interpretation&#8221; issues from more flexible<br />
frameworks and methodologies.</p>
<p>So,<br />
I&#8217;ll add people that I think will bring value to this discussion.<br />
Please feel free to expand the wave. Let&#8217;s see where it will take us.</p>
<p>(I&#8217;m<br />
also don&#8217;t know how to invite some people that I know is testing Wave<br />
but I&#8217;m not seeing in my contact list&#8230;how do I do it?)</p>
<p>Some interesting references to consider/read about this subject:</p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://infosecblog.antonaylward.com/2009/08/03/re-iso-27001-security-re-significant-impact-calculation-in-business/">http://infosecblog.antonaylward.com/2009/08/03/re-iso-27001-security-re-significant-impact-calculation-in-business/</a></p>
<p><span><span></span></span></p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2006/06/risk-based-security-is-emperors-new.html">http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2006/06/risk-based-security-is-emperors-new.html</a></p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/09/donn-parkers-risks-of-risk-based.html">http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/09/donn-parkers-risks-of-risk-based.html</a></p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/09/is-risk-just-too-risky.html">http://chuvakin.blogspot.com/2009/09/is-risk-just-too-risky.html</a></p>
<p><a target="_blank" href="http://www.bloginfosec.com/2009/09/28/classy-data-pt-3-%E2%80%93-ownership-and-risk/">http://www.bloginfosec.com/2009/09/28/classy-data-pt-3-%E2%80%93-ownership-and-risk/</a><span class="__wave_paste"></span><span> <br /></span></p>
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		<title>Attack Vector Risk Management</title>
		<link>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/03/attack-vector-risk-management/</link>
		<comments>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/03/attack-vector-risk-management/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Mar 2009 19:41:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>apbarros</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ROSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[out of the box]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[attack vector risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[threat modelling]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/03/attack-vector-risk-management/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[I read this post from Michael Dahn and I really liked what he called &#8220;Attack Vector Risk Management&#8221;. Today I saw that the guys from Sensepost also noted the post for the same reasons, and even showed some of their work under the same concept, calling it &#8220;Corporate Threat Modeling&#8221;. During the last months my [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I read <a href="http://pcianswers.com/2009/03/11/there-is-no-spoon-compliance-in-a-new-world/">this post from Michael Dahn</a> and I really liked what he called &#8220;Attack Vector Risk Management&#8221;. Today I saw that <a href="http://www.sensepost.com/blog/3193.html">the guys from Sensepost also noted the post</a> for the same reasons, and even showed some of their work under the same concept, calling it &#8220;Corporate Threat Modeling&#8221;.</p>
<p>During the last months my main interest is enterprise security planning. How should an organization define how to spend its security resources, what should be done and in what order? Risk Management is usually the answer for that (please DON&#8217;T SAY COMPLIANCE!), but IMHO the <b>risk assessment methodologies out there just don&#8217;t scale to a point where they can be used to drive security decisions in an enterprise level</b>. You start using so many &#8220;educated guesses&#8221; that the end result is just not intellectually honest, everything is extremely biased to what people believe that are their major risks that just a simple brainstorm would probably generate the same results. Have you ever seen the results of an enterprise level RA being a surprise to anyone (except for dumb as hell CISOs!)? I haven&#8217;t.</p>
<p>I don&#8217;t think that Sensepost approach escalates well too, but it seems better than regular RA for me. I believe we can come tom something that is &#8220;threat oriented&#8221; than can generate a better understanding of an organization security requirements and help the development of a security strategy. After that we will finally be able to bury ROI/ROSI stuff and stop pretending that those beautiful tables with numbers, &#8220;high/medium/low&#8221;s&nbsp; or &#8220;green/yellow/red&#8221;s are something more our minds tricking us into believing that there is a mathematical explanation behind our intuitive perception. </p>
<p>Until there, you can read <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Blink-Power-Thinking-Without/dp/0316010669/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&amp;s=books&amp;qid=1236886720&amp;sr=8-1">&#8220;Blink&#8221;</a>, from Malcolm Gladwell (yes, the guy from the current best seller, &#8220;Outliers&#8221;), to see that simply trusting our intuitive side is not that bad, although I just can&#8217;t see a CISO telling an auditor that his security strategy is &#8220;intuition based&#8221; <img src='http://www.securitybalance.com/wp-includes/images/smilies/icon_smile.gif' alt=':-)' class='wp-smiley' /> </p>
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		<item>
		<title>Still on &#8220;security as a cost&#8221;</title>
		<link>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/still-on-security-as-a-cost/</link>
		<comments>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/still-on-security-as-a-cost/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 03:49:42 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>apbarros</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ROSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[risk management]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mcaffee]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/still-on-security-as-a-cost/</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Lawrence Pingree, from McAffee, was kind to comment my post about his post on McAffee&#8217;s&#160; blog on &#8220;security not being a cost&#8221;. Well, I must say that what he expressed on that comment didn&#8217;t change my mind at all. As he said, security can be an enabler. I understand this statement as saying that it [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://siblog.mcafee.com/?p=476&amp;cpage=1#comment-111609">Lawrence Pingree, from McAffee</a>, was kind to <a href="http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/security-cost-center/#comments">comment my post about his post on McAffee&#8217;s&nbsp; blog</a> on &#8220;security not being a cost&#8221;. Well, I must say that what he expressed on that comment didn&#8217;t change my mind at all. </p>
<p>As he said, security can be an enabler. I understand this statement as saying that it allows us to do something under an acceptable risk level. We could still do the same things without security and get the same savings (like using Internet connections instead of dedicated circuits). The difference is that most people won&#8217;t do that without mitigating the risks. However, in order to do that, there is a cost. That&#8217;s security. You can keep a single person submitting a transaction, that will certainly be the lowest possible cost. But, in order to reduce the risk from that person abusing the system, you add an approver. That&#8217;s a cost. The action is still the same (the transaction), but now it happens under a reduced risk and with a higher cost. </p>
<p>That being said, it doesn&#8217;t mean that&#8217;s something bad! There are lots of things that are costs, like insurance, fire extinguishers or employee health insurance. It&#8217;s not bad to expend that money, but you always try to find how to get the better results expending less money. If you go this way on the budget discussions, you will be following the safe way.</p>
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		<title>Security: cost center</title>
		<link>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/security-cost-center/</link>
		<comments>http://www.securitybalance.com/2009/02/security-cost-center/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2009 19:01:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>apbarros</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Quick comment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ROSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cost center]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[productivity]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitybalance.com/?p=352</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Mike Rothman made me LOL very very hard today with this post about McAfee&#8217;s attempt to say that compliance is not a cost center. Mike is completely right in saying that many had tried to do that and it didn&#8217;t work. Mostly because yes, it is essentially cost. Most of the demonstrations of security as a [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mike Rothman made me LOL very very hard today with <a href="http://securityincite.com/blog/mike-rothman/compliance-is-so-a-cost-center">this post </a>about <a href="http://siblog.mcafee.com/?p=476">McAfee&#8217;s attempt to say that compliance is not a cost center</a>. Mike is completely right in saying that many had tried to do that and it didn&#8217;t work. Mostly because yes, it is essentially cost. Most of the demonstrations of security as a revenue center are artificially created by getting the benefits from other stuff and justifying it as security benefits because security allows them to materialize. It happens all the time with VPNs. That&#8217;s not the VPN that saves money from network connections, it is the Internet! VPNs just make the risk from using the Internet for sensitive communication acceptable.</p>
<p>What impressed me most on McAfee&#8217;s post was this particular point:</p>
<p><em>&#8220;Security streamlines and clearly defines roles and responsibilities making information flow more quickly through an organization&#8221;</em></p>
<p>Wow, that was brutal! Security directly and negatively impacts productivity, that&#8217;s a fact that we can&#8217;t run away from. That&#8217;s what makes this job so interesting, trying to make that impact as small as possible. We can&#8217;t, however, deny that it is there. As Mike cleverly said, wrong way. That&#8217;s that famous ROSI (ugh!) discussion.</p>
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		<title>Gunnar Peterson and security budget</title>
		<link>http://www.securitybalance.com/2007/10/gunnar-peterson-and-security-budget/</link>
		<comments>http://www.securitybalance.com/2007/10/gunnar-peterson-and-security-budget/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 05 Oct 2007 20:49:00 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Augusto</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[ROSI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[out of the box]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[budget]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investment]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.securitybalance.com/?p=124</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[This post from Gunnar Peterson about security budgets is extremely interesting. The comparison that he suggests between security budgets and IT budgets is a very good way to detect misconceptions about security needs and alignment between the IT strategy and the security strategy. However, it&#8217;s important to mention that some network solutions can solve problems [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://1raindrop.typepad.com/1_raindrop/2007/10/network-securit.html">This post from Gunnar Peterson</a> about security budgets is extremely interesting. The comparison that he suggests between security budgets and IT budgets is a very good way to detect misconceptions about security needs and alignment between the IT strategy and the security strategy.</p>
<p>However, it&#8217;s important to mention that some network solutions can solve problems that have their root cause in other layers. It&#8217;s also important to perform the comparison in a time line perspective, as you may need to invest more in a specific layer now to address a gap created by past IT investments in that layer without the related security budget.</p>
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